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Abstract  
Ordoliberalism is a German school of economic thought that advocates regulation of the free market 
economy based on a set of state-imposed rules guaranteed by the economic constitution, to impose a 
competitive order in society. It proposes an alternative method to pure laissez-faire and state-
planned economy for the better regulation of the market economy, where the goals are the 
protection of the competitive process and individual freedom. In this paper I submit that 
ordoliberalism, an indigenous European competition policy, is an adequate economic and analytical 
tool upon which to base the practice and decision-making of competition law. My aim is twofold: to 
contribute to the discussion on what ordoliberalism is, in general, and in particular concerning 
competition policy, and offer a fresh perspective on an ordoliberal-oriented competition policy. 
Keywords: Ordoliberalism; competition law; law and economics; economic constitution; German neo-
liberalism; social market economy; Freiburg School of Law and Economics. 
 
1. Introduction 
Ordoliberal ideas of Wettbewerbsordnung and Wettbewerbsfreiheit — competitive order 
and freedom to compete — have partially influenced the historical development of the 
internal market,1 and EU competition policy.2 At its core, ordoliberalism (also known as 
                                                        
* LLM; PhD Candidate at the Faculty of Law of the University of Bergen and member of the Bergen Center 
for Competition Law and Economics; e-mail: Ignacio.Herrera-Anchustegui@uib.no. This paper has been 
written during a research visit to the University of Freiburg and the Walker Eucken Institut. I wish to 
thank professors Viktor Vanberg, Lars Feld and Boris Paal, along with research associates Heiko Burret 
and Daniel Nientiedt and research assistant Johanna Schworm for their support and assistance in the 
research conducted to support this paper. I would also like to thank Professor Jørn Øyrehagen Sunde 
(University of Bergen), Lecturer Sebastian Peyer (Leicester University) and Senior Lecturer Albert 
Sánchez Graells (Leicester University), Professor Wouter Wils (King’s College London), Dr Liza Gormsen 
(British Institute of International and Comparative Law), Jan Broulik (PhD Candidate at Tilburg 
University), and the two anonymous referees and editors of the Oslo Law Review for their helpful 
comments on a previous draft. Any errors are those of the author alone. 
1 Karel Van Miert (Member of the European Commission), ‘The Future of European Competition Policy’, 
europa.eu (17 September 1998) <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp1998_042_en.html> 
accessed 6 November 2015; Alessandro Somma, ‘Private Law as Biopolitics: Ordoliberalism, Social Market 
Economy, and the Public Dimension of Contract’ (2013) 76 Law and Contemporary Problems 105. 
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the ‘Freiburg School of Law and Economics’ or German neo-liberalism)3 advocates a 
state-regulated competitive process as a necessary instrument for the protection of 
individual economic freedom.4 Ordoliberalism, however, is not just about competition 
policy, it also views the competitive process as a pillar of a holistic political economy and 
societal order.5 Importantly, ordoliberalism represents an original and indigenous 
European trend of thinking that, along with other pluralistic economic and legal 
schools,6 has shaped, and continues to influence EU law in general, and EU competition 
policy in particular. 7 Although the extent of the influence of ordoliberalism may be 
contested, its influence is nevertheless undeniable.8  
In this paper, I present the core ordoliberal ideas and discuss the influence of 
ordoliberalism in competition law and the implications of its application as an analytical 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2 David J Gerber, ‘Constitutionalizing the Economy: German Neo-Liberalism, Competition Law and the 
"New" Europe’ (1994) 42 The American Journal of Comparative Law 25, 49; David J Gerber, Law and 
Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting Prometheus (Oxford University Press 2001) ch VII; 
Ian Rose and Cynthia Ngwe, ‘The Ordoliberal Tradition in the European Union, its Influence on Article 82 
EC and the IBA’s Comments on the Article 82 EC Discussion Paper’ (2007) 3 Competition Law International 
8; Liza Lovdahl Gormsen, ‘The Conflict Between Economic Freedom and Consumer Welfare in the 
Modernisation of Article 82 EC’ (2007) 3 European Competition Journal 329; Flavio Felice and 
Massimiliano Vatiero, ‘Ordo and European Competition Law’, Società Italiana degli Economisti (September 
2013) <http://www.siecon.org/online/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Felice-Vatiero.pdf> accessed 12 
December 2015. 
3 An alternative name is used by Alan Peacock and Hans Willgerodt, who refer to the Ordo-Kreis (Ordo-
Circle) to denote a group of scholars who are part of this trend, although notably, not all scholars who 
adhere to this teaching have studied or taught at the University of Freiburg; see also Alan Peacock and 
Hans Willgerodt, ‘German Neo-Liberals and the Social Market Economy’ in Alan Peacock and Hans 
Willgerodt (eds), German Neo-Liberals and the Social Market Economy, vol 1 (MacMillan 1989) 1-320. 
4 Werner Bonefeld, ‘Freedom and the Strong State: On German Ordoliberalism’ (2012) 17 New Political 
Economy 633, 638. 
5 Alfred Müller-Armack, ‘The Social Market Economy as an Economic and Social Order’ (1978) 36 Review 
of Social Economy 325, 327; Manfred E Streit, ‘Economic Order, Private Law and Public Policy – The 
Freiburg School of Law and Economics in Perspective’ (1992) 148 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical 
Economics 675. 
6 In particular, since the adoption of the Commission’s ‘more economic approach’, the influence of the 
Chicago and Post-Chicago schools has been of great importance.  
7 See recently Joined Cases C-501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P and C-519/06 P GlaxoSmithKline Services 
and Others v Commission and Others [2009] ECR I-09291, para 63. Also stressing the ordoliberal influence, 
see Peter Behrens, ‘The “Consumer Choice” Paradigm in German Ordoliberalism and its Impact upon EU 
Competition Law’ (2014) 1/14 Discussion Papers from Europa-Kolleg Hamburg, Institute for European 
Integration <http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/zbwekhdps/114.htm> accessed 1 December 2015. See 
also the treatment of rebates in Case T-286/09 Intel v Commission [2014] EU:T:2014:547, not yet 
published in ECR. 
8 See eg the views of Akman who claims that ordoliberal ideas were by and large not incorporated into the 
drafting of Art 102 TFEU, in Pinar Akman, ‘Searching for the Long-Lost Soul of Article 82 EC’ (2009) 29 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 267; Pinar Akman, The Concept of Abuse in EU Competition Law: Law and 
Economic Approaches (Hart 2012) 55-105; also rejecting the influence of ordoliberal ideas in the scope of 
Art 102, see Renato Nazzini, The Foundations of European Union Competition Law: The objective and 
principles of article 102 (Oxford University Press 2011) 131-132. 
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tool. Competition law deals with the relationship between the state and the economy,9 
by defining behaviour that due to its pernicious welfare effects undertakings are 
precluded from entering into. In my view, economic theory has three main functions in 
competition law: firstly, it serves as the framework of reference for competition policy’s 
design and the laws to be applied; secondly, it enables understanding of the economic 
consequences of an undertaking’s behaviour and welfare effects;10 and thirdly, it 
informs the application and interpretation of legal rules to particular economic 
activities.11 This context, the application of ordoliberalism to competition policy and law 
(alone and/or in conjunction with other economic trends) establishes the theoretical 
framework, goals and guiding principles for determining when conduct jeopardises the 
economic well-being of society.12 In other words, the application of ordoliberalism acts 
as a guiding mechanism for the coherent and consistent design, interpretation and 
application of competition rules.  
The aim of this paper is to promote the understanding of ordoliberalism as a school of 
thought that can be applied in the design of a coherent competition policy, and to 
examine its implications. To this end, the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 
describes the origins and evolution of ordoliberalism and presents its main 
representatives. Section 3 addresses the core ideas of ordoliberalism as an economic 
and social philosophy. Section 4 comprises an analysis of ordoliberal perspectives on 
competition and its conception. In Section 5, I present my proposals for the adoption of a 
contemporary ordoliberally-oriented competition policy. Finally, Section 6 concludes 
with a summary of the findings and further suggestions for the future.  
  
                                                        
9 See Carl Baudenbacher, ‘Swiss Economic Law Facing the Challenges of International and European Law’ 
(2012) II Zeitschrift für Schweizerisches Recht 419, 427 (mentioning that the concept of economic law 
(Wirtschaftsrecht) is a German concept conceived in the late 1920s and early 1930s — the period in which 
the ordoliberal school of thought emerged). 
10 Vivian Rose and David Bailey (eds), Bellamy & Child: European Union Law of Competition (Oxford 
University Press 2013) para 1.014.  
11 Judgment of the EFTA Court, E-8/00 Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions and Others v Norwegian 
Association of Local and Regional Authorities and Others [2002], para 55; Judgment of the EFTA Court, E-
15/10 Posten Norge AS v EFTA Surveillance Authority [2012], para 126.  
12 Case C-52/09 TeliaSonera Sverige [2011] ECR I-00527, para 60. 
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2. The Birth of Ordoliberalism 
2.1. Origins 
Ordoliberalism originated in late 1920s and early 1930s Germany, a by-product of its 
time: on the one hand, emerging from the German crisis of 1921-1923, the Great 
Depression of 1929, the Weimar Republic’ failure in 1933, and the Nazi regime’s central 
planning efforts,13 and, on the other hand, a reaction to the state-planned economy of the 
Soviet Union at that time.14 Ordoliberals recognised that, at this period in time, a weak 
state could be greatly influenced by private economic market power, as represented by 
industry cartels, thereby eliminating true competition and generating social chaos.15 For 
ordoliberals, the concentration of economic power curbs individual economic freedom 
and dominates the state’s decision-making function. Although market power controls 
society’s economic life, the state is controlled by private powers, leading to historical 
tropes such as serfdom and slavery.16 Furthermore, ordoliberals rejected the notion of a 
central planned economy on the grounds that it was inefficient and restricted individual 
freedom. Accordingly, ordoliberalism became an alternative to laissez-faire and central 
planning by virtue of promoting the existence of a strong state governing economic 
activity, as well as nurturing the freedom to compete, enshrined by set rules 
incorporated into the economic constitution.17  
Ordoliberals had two sources of inspiration and opposition: classical liberal theory 
inspired by Anglo-Saxon economics, and the Germanic influence of the Historical 
School.18 As ‘liberals’,19 they emphasised individual freedom and protection from the 
                                                        
13 Gerber, ‘Constitutionalizing the Economy’ (n 2) 25; cf with Somma (n 1) 105, 110-111. For a discussion 
of Nazism from an ordoliberal perspective, see Michel Foucault and others, The Birth of Biopolitics: 
Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-1979 (Graham Burchell tr, Palgrave Macmillan 2008) 109-115. 
14 Oliver Marc Hartwich, Neoliberalism: The Genesis of a Political Swearword (The Centre for Independent 
Studies (CIS) 2009) 1, 6-7. 
15 Walter Eucken, ‘El Problema Político de la Ordenación’ in Lucas Beltrán (ed), La Economía de Mercado, 
vol I (Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones 1948) 45ff; Streit (n 5) 675, 689; Bonefeld (n 4) 633, 634. 
16 Eucken (n 15) 55-56. 
17 Ulrich Kamecke, ‘The Proper Scope of Government Viewed from an Ordoliberal Perspective: The 
Example of Competition Policy: Comment’ (2001) 157 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 
(JITE) 23, 24. 
18 Peacock and Willgerodt (n 3). For a discussion on the importance and implications of this dualistic 
source of inspiration, see Joachim Zweynert, ‘How German is German Neo-liberalism?’ (2013) 26 Review of 
Austrian Economics 109; also highlighting the influence of the Historical School, see Gerber, 
‘Constitutionalizing the Economy’ (n 2) 25, 34; James C Van Hook, Rebuilding Germany: The Creation of the 
Social Market Economy, 1945–1957 (Cambridge University Press 2004) 243. 
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interference of public power in the private sphere. However, unlike classic liberals they 
argued for the control of private economic power.20 In ordoliberalism, personal and 
political freedom cannot be achieved spontaneously as unrestrained economic 
competition would lead to power struggles: a state of Vermachtung (or a self-destructive 
tendency) would arise in which private market power is abused in contravention to the 
interests of society.21 To avoid this, ordoliberalism advocates a strong state that defines 
the set of economic rules in an institutional framework that directs economic 
competition.22 Accordingly, the state acts as a Marktpolizei (market police), imposing 
rules to establish order and coordinate human actions in the economic sphere23 by 
virtue of restraining the abuse of market power and securing competition based on a set 
of rules that protect individual economic freedom.24 Consequently, ordoliberalism 
proposes a holistic view of orders in society that separates economics from politics,25 
and counts on a strong state with clearly prescribed functions defined by law. 
From a methodological perspective, ordoliberals’ ideas were based on the interaction 
between economic, political and legal orders in an attempt to translate the classical body 
of economic theory from the language of economics into the language of legal sciences, 
in a truly multidisciplinary effort.26 Such translation in practice, however, has been 
deemed a ‘key failure’ of ordoliberalism by Grosskettler as it was not sufficiently or 
properly done.27 I do not share this view when it comes to reception of ordoliberal ideas 
                                                                                                                                                                             
19 Alan Peacock and Hans Willgerodt label them ‘end-state liberals’, meaning that they adopt particular 
ethical positions that can be translated into economic language, such as individual freedom and just 
income distribution: see Peacock and Willgerodt (n 3) 3-4; NP Barry, ‘Political and Economic Thought of 
German Neo-Liberals’ in Alan Peacock and Hans Willgerodt (eds), German Neo-Liberals and the Social 
Market Economy, vol 1 (MacMillan 1989) 112-133. 
20 Gerber, ‘Constitutionalizing the Economy’ (n 2) 25, 37; Foucault and others (n 13) 108. 
21 Barry J Rodger, ‘Competition Policy, Liberalism and Globalization: A European Perspective’ (2000) 6 
Columbia Journal of European Law 289, 294; Zweynert (n 18) 115. 
22 The concepts of ‘ordo’ and a strong state are particularly prominent in the work of Eucken (n 15); see 
also Streit (n 5) 680. 
23 ibid 679; Alexander Ebner, ‘The Intellectual Foundations of the Social Market Economy’ (2006) 33 
Journal of Economic Studies 206, 213. 
24 Bonefeld (n 4) 634. 
25 For a discussion on the importance and implications of this dualistic source of inspiration, see Peacock 
and Willgerodt (n 3) 4; Zweynert (n 18) 122. 
26 Similarly, on the interdisciplinary character of ordoliberalism, see Peacock and Willgerodt (n 3) 4; Kiran 
Klaus Patel and Heike Schweitzer, ‘EU Competition Law in Historical Context: Continuity and Change’ in 
Kiran Klaus Patel and Heike Schweitzer (eds), The Historical foundation of EU competition law (Oxford 
University Press 2013) 207-230, 223.  
27 HG Grosskettler, ‘On Designing an Economic Order: The Contribution of the Freiburg School’ in Donald A 
Walker (ed), Perspectives on the History of Economic Thought, vol 2: Twentieth-Century Economic Thought 
(Edward Elgar Publishing Inc 1989) 38; Streit (n 5) 675; Rodger (n 21) 289; Gerber, Law and Competition 
in Twentieth Century Europe (n 2). 
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in German and EU competition law. As is illustrated in this paper, certain ordoliberal 
ideas have been incorporated into legal sources of EU competition law.28  
2.2. Waves of Ordoliberal Schools of Thought 
There is no single approach to ordoliberalism and the term is frequently applied in a 
rather imprecise manner. In my opinion, this has given rise to misunderstandings 
regarding the theories that underpin ordoliberalism and over-simplification of the 
underlying ideas.29 In an effort to impart some clarity here, I distinguish between three 
‘waves’ of ordoliberal scholars.30 The first wave, known as the ‘Freiburg School’ dates 
back to the origins of ordoliberalism in the 1930s and 1940s in Germany, at the 
University of Freiburg, the early proponents of which were Walter Eucken, Franz Böhm 
and Hans Grossmann-Doerth — at this time, ordoliberalism was used in a rather narrow 
sense.31 A second wave of ordoliberal-related thinkers emerged in the 1940s and 1950s. 
Distinct from the Freiburg school, this wave was championed by Alexander Rüstow, 
Wilhelm Röpke,32 Alfred Müller-Armack, Leonhard Miksch and Ludwig Erhard.33 This 
second wave of ordoliberal thinkers developed the concept of social market economy34 
and emphasised humanistic values within economic ideas.35 They had a clear impact on 
the ‘European project’ (although not necessarily greater impact than the first wave), 
given the incorporation of the concept of ‘social market economy’ in the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU) Article 3. Lastly, a third wave of ordoliberals, known as the 
                                                        
28 Sharing this view and calling the victory of the legal wing of ordoliberalism ‘remarkably successful’ and 
supporting the opinion that ordoliberal ideas extended their influence to competition policy within the EU, 
see Peacock and Willgerodt (n 3); also emphasising the goal and success of this interpretation, see Patel 
and Schweitzer (n 26) 223. 
29 A similar criticism has been raised by Ebner, in terms of misunderstanding that has arisen concerning 
the concept of social market economy: Ebner (n 23) 223. Likewise, Gerber acknowledges the confusion 
regarding this concept that is abound in English works, in Gerber, ‘Constitutionalizing the Economy’ (n 2) 
25, 31. 
30 Cf. Nils Goldschmidt and Arnold Berndt, ‘Leonhard Miksch (1901–1950) A Forgotten Member of the 
Freiburg School’ (2005) 64 American Journal of Economics and Sociology 973, 992 (fn 1). 
31 ibid; see also Streit (n 5) 675; Viktor Vanberg ‘Freiburg School of Law and Economics’ in Peter Newman 
(ed), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, vol 2 (Palgrave Macmillan 1998); Rodger (n 21) 293. For 
an overview of the work of Böhm, see J Tumlir, ‘Franz Böhm and the Development of Economic-
constitutional Analysis’ in Alan Peacock and Hans Willgerodt (eds), German Neo-Liberals and the Social 
Market Economy, vol 1 (MacMillan 1989) 125-141. 
32 Rüstow and Röpke are the main representatives of sociological liberalism. 
33 Cf the ‘second generation’ of ordoliberal scholars which Vanberg refers to, including Hensel, Lenel and 
Mestmäcker; Vanberg (n 31) 173.  
34 Streit (n 5) 678; Hartwich (n 14) 21. 
35 Vanberg (n 31) 172; regarding Röpke and Müller-Armack, see also Gerber, ‘Constitutionalizing the 
Economy’ (n 2) 32. Cf Bonefeld (n 4) 633 (who does not distinguish between narrow and broader 
qualifications of scholars). 
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‘Freiburg Tradition’, emerged, represented by Friedrich August von Hayek, Erich 
Hoppmann, Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker, Manfred E Streit and Viktor Vanberg. These 
scholars focussed on economic order and competition policy in particular (most notably 
Hoppmann and Mestmäcker).36 They continued the ordoliberal school of thought, 
incorporating new economic elements and venturing into other areas, such as 
constitutional economics.37 As this evolution of schools of thought attests to, it is hard to 
pinpoint one systematic, unified and condensed exposition of ordoliberal thinking; 
rather, individual and relatively distinct approaches in ordoliberalism are readily 
apparent.38 
3. Central Themes of Ordoliberalism 
3.1. Ordoliberalism at a Glance 
Ordoliberalism advocates a holistic social policy covering most aspects of social life, one 
not purely limited to the economic aspect of it as a social-philosophy.39 From an 
economic perspective, it proposes a ‘third way’40 between neo-liberalism and state-
planned economy by preserving a large degree of laissez-faire while advocating the 
creation of ‘an institutional framework which brings order to economic processes in a 
liberal atmosphere’. 41  That said, ordoliberalism should not be understood as a 
                                                        
36 Although these scholars are not generally associated with ordoliberal ideas, the concepts they discuss 
are nevertheless anchored in legal and economic aspects related to ordoliberalism, see further Michael 
Wohlgemuth, ‘Introduction: German Neo-liberalism and its Relevance for Austrian Economics’ (2013) 26 
Review of Austrian Economics 105, 106-108. Linking these thinkers to the Virginia school of constitutional 
economics, see Ioannis Lianos, ‘Some Reflections on the Question of the Goals of EU Competition Law’ 
(2013) 3/2013 ‘CLES Working Paper Series’. 
37 The works of Viktor Vanberg, Wolfgang Kerber and JM Buchanan are particularly good representations 
of this as they mainly focus on larger constitutional topics; see Wolfgang Kerber and Viktor Vanberg, 
‘Constitutional Aspects of Party Autonomy and Its Limits – The Perspective of Constitutional Economics’ in 
Stefan Grundmann, Wolfgang Kerber and Stephen Weatherill (eds), Party Autonomy and the Role of 
Information in the Internal Market (de Gruyter 2001) 49-79. 
38 Bonefeld (n 4) 635; Wohlgemuth (n 36) 105. Also raising the difficulty of defining academic ‘schools’ in 
the field of US Antitrust, see Malcolm B Coate and Jeffrey H Fischer, ‘Is Market Definition Still Needed After 
All These Years’ (2014) 2 Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 422, 431. 
39 Wernhard Möschel, ‘Competition Policy from an Ordo Point of View’ in Alan Peacock and Hans 
Willgerodt (eds), German Neo-Liberals and the Social Market Economy, vol 1 (MacMillan 1989) 142. 
40 For Eucken, ‘the number of organizational forms (of the economy and society), in which the modern 
economy may be ordered is very small’, thus portraying his idea that ordoliberalism is an alternative way 
between capitalism and centrally planned economies: Eucken (n 15) 79. See also Jack Wiseman, ‘Social 
Policy and the Social Market Economy’ in Alan Peacock and Hans Willgerodt (eds), German Neo-Liberals 
and the Social Market Economy, vol 1 (MacMillan 1989); Rodger (n 21) 293; also using the term ‘third way’, 
Gerber, ‘Constitutionalizing the Economy’ (n 2) 35; Foucault and others (n 13) 119-120; Bonefeld (n 4) 
634. 
41 Grossketler (n 27). For Foucault this is rather an ‘anti-Keynesian’ position, see Foucault and others (n 
13). 
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compromise between state-planned economy and pure laissez-faire — it proposes 
adopting an institutional framework for the (better) regulation of the market economy. 
Its aim is to reinstate law and economic policy in their proper place by setting clear rules; 
establishing an order and legitimising the rule ‘of [the] state on the basis of a space of 
freedom for the economic partners’.42 In this regard, what is known as the ‘Freiburg 
Imperative’43 is anchored in regulating the competitive order of market freedom, 
protection of private property; trust in the market-price system,44 and institutional 
pillars governing other societal aspects of human life.45 Its fundamental pillar is the price 
system, in order to ensure an efficient outcome and effective use of resources.46 For 
ordoliberals, the efficiency of an economic system is not dependent on the market’s 
invisible hand but on the appropriateness of the economic constitution’s rules.47 The 
underlying philosophy is that by incorporating economic and legal theory into legal 
regulation, economic efficiency should follow. The logic of the argument is very Smithian: 
improving the game rules and creating conditions of effective competition enables 
individuals to pursue their own self-interest, while at the same time promoting society’s 
interest.48 The philosophy is that if economic life is organised in accordance with free 
market principles, disciplining a market participant’s behaviour by clear state-imposed 
legal-economic rules (in accordance to the rule of law) would be socially beneficial, thus 
bringing economic order to society.49 Such order ‘consists in all the forms in which it is 
carried out the direction of daily economic process’,50 and should be dictated by the state. 
The order is not limited to imposing rules — it also encompasses the relationship 
between different levels of rules: the economic constitution, and economic activities 
conducted by individuals in society.51  
  
                                                        
42 Foucault and others (n 13) 106. 
43 Ebner (n 23) 213. 
44 Such as suppressing price controls, as done by Erhard in Germany in the 1950s. 
45 Ebner (n 23) 213; similarly, see Peacock and Willgerodt (n 3) 7. 
46 Kamecke (n 17) 24. 
47 Vanberg (n 31) 173. 
48 ibid 174. 
49 See the rather extreme view of Foucault who claims that for ordoliberals free market should be the 
organising principle of the state: ‘a state under supervision of the market rather than a market supervised 
by the state’, in Foucault and others (n 13) 116. 
50 Eucken (n 15) 36. 
51 Vanberg (n 31) 173. 
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3.2. The Economic Constitution [Wirtschaftsverfassung] 
To establish the economic process’ rules, ordoliberals proposed the adoption of an 
economic constitution.52  An economic constitution is a political instrument that ‘defines 
the rules of the game under which economic activities can be carried out in the 
respective jurisdictions’.53 It imposes positive and negative limits on state intervention 
in the economy in a normative sense inspired by the Rechtsstaat legal traditions.54 The 
aim of these limits, or rules, is to enhance private cooperation. The intended outcome is 
that parties would act in a competitive manner, increasing their economic performance 
and efficiency and preserving the competitiveness in society.55 The concept’s creator, 
Böhm, conceived of this strategy as means by which the economic system could be 
synchronised with the law.56 This approach therefore deviates from the liberal idea that 
the economy should to be separate from law, Wirtschaftsordnung57 (denoting society’s 
economic structure) entails the incorporation of society’s economic structure into legal 
language.58 In terms of its normative aspect, it contains both constitutive principles and 
regulative principles, which are those necessary for the constitution to work. The former 
are private property; market price-setting; economic freedom and freedom of contract, 
while the latter is understood as the state’s duty to regulate economic relations to avoid 
the self-destructive force of competition.59  
For Böhm, the economic constitution is rooted in the concept of a ‘private law society’, 
freedom of contract and voluntary transactions.60 Private law represents the link 
between the individual, their peers and the States within the ‘private law society’.61 
Böhm’s rationale is that the connection between the state and the individual is created 
through private autonomy rather than as a constituent of the political constitution. In 
                                                        
52 Ebner (n 23) 215. 
53 Kerber and Vanberg (2001) 53. 
54 Gerber, ‘Constitutionalizing the Economy’ (n 2) 46. 
55 Somma (n 1) 109. 
56 Tumlir (n 31) 136. 
57 Vanberg (n 31) 173. 
58 Gerber, ‘Constitutionalizing the Economy’ (n 2) 45. 
59 Barry (n 19) 114-155 
60 For the function of private law in ordoliberal thinking, see Franz Böhm, ‘Rule of Law in a Market 
Economy’ in Hans Willgerodt and Alan Peacock (n 3) 46-67; Tumlir (n 31) 136; Viktor Vanberg, ‘Consumer 
Welfare, Total Welfare and Economic Freedom — On the Normative Foundations of Competition Policy’ 
(2009) 09 Freiburger Diskussionspapier zur Ordnungsökonomik 10. 
61 Franz Böhm, Walter Eucken and Hans Grossmann-Doerth, ‘The Ordo Manifesto of 1936’ in Alan Peacock 
and Hans Willgerodt (eds), Germany's Social Market Economy: Origins and Evolution, vol 2 (MacMillan 
1989) 50. 
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contemporary times (compared to Böhm’s characterisation of the economic constitution 
in 1989), I argue that the economic constitution and the private sphere are connected 
because the former protects, and defines the limit of, the latter. The economic 
constitution has influenced EU law in general and competition law specifically. In 
essence, the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) and their predecessors could be seen as manifestations of the 
‘European economic constitution’, regulating the rights and obligations of Member 
States and individuals within the common market by setting the European economic 
order and internal market. 
Viewed from a different perspective, some have characterised the economic constitution 
as analogous to the Kelsen’s concept of Grundnorm.62 I differ in this regard, however, I 
understand the concept of Grundnorm as a source of sources and the rule against which 
the validity of derived rules is contrasted. The economic constitution, on the other hand, 
is an articulation of the rules of the game under which social and economic life is played 
in accordance with the rule of the law,63 and is not a superior norm. Moreover, the 
Economic Constitution does not only relate to pure positive law, as the Kelsenian 
Grundnorm does, but also includes ‘informal conventions and traditions that govern 
economic activities in the respective communities’.64 In my view, by setting positive and 
negative limits on state intervention the economic constitution recognises the primacy 
of the rule of law. It operates as an instrument of coordinating in legal and economic 
orders by organising the relation between the different economic actors, protecting 
economic freedom and promoting the competitive process. 
3.3. Social Market Economy [Soziale Marktwirtschaft] 
The concept of social market economy [Soziale Marktwirtschaft] is another key 
ordoliberal influence on the European project, as is reflected in Article 3.3 TEU, which 
states:  
The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the 
sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth 
                                                        
62 Felice and Vatiero (n 2). For the idea of the ‘Grundnorm’, see Hans Kelsen, General theory of law and 
state, vol 1 (reissued edn, Russell & Russell 1961) 123-161. 
63 Franz Böhm (n 62). 
64 Eucken (n 65) 377. 
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and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at 
full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and 
improvement of the quality of the environment. It shall promote scientific 
and technological advance.65 
Paradoxically, this concept also represents its most state-interventionist line of thought 
because, as Hayek underlined, it compromises individual freedom. Introduced by 
Müller-Armarck in 1946, it was described as ‘market freedom with social balance’, 
combining the productive prosperity of a capitalist-driven economy with institutions 
and regulations guided by the pursuance of social justice.66 Historically, the idea of 
promoting an efficient but socially responsible market economy emerged and flourished 
in the atrocious conditions in Europe post-World War II and the economic failure of 
liberalism adopted under the Weimar Republic which led to the Nazi regime. The goal of 
a social market economy is to correlate social balance with entrepreneurship and 
market competition in order to foster economic productivity.67 Furthermore, Müller-
Armack argues that an objective of social market economy is to maximise individual 
satisfaction:  
(w)here the individual is judge of his own satisfaction and also has the 
most complete knowledge of the goods and services which will promote 
that satisfaction. Individual satisfaction, however does require taking a 
view of the distribution of income and wealth and therefore of the 
possibility that individuals will increase their own satisfaction by 
transferring resources to the less fortunate, although not in ways which 
will defeat the basic aim.68 
The social market economic rests on three pillars:  
i) A competition policy based on the system of Ordnungsökonomie 
[Constitutional Economics];  
                                                        
65 See Art 3 TEU (emphasis added). For an historical account of the evolution of the social market economy, 
see Gerber, ‘Constitutionalizing the Economy’ (n 2); Van Hook (n 18). 
66 Streit (n 5) 696; Ebner (n 23) 215. In similar terms, see the view of Karel Van Miert, former European 
Commisioner for Competition, in Van Miert (n 1). 
67 Ebner (n 23) 216 
68 Taken from Peacock and Willgerodt (n 3) 4, who quote the German original by Müller-Armack. 
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ii) Abandonment of policies that unsystematically foster state interventionism; 
and  
iii) An economic policy based on the market economy in rejection of the central 
planned model.69  
In an attempt to reconcile the concept with classic ordoliberalism, Barry identifies two 
more main objectives of social market economy:  
iv) The provision of welfare measures, and  
v) Preservation of freedom and autonomy vis-à-vis the state.70  
For Müller-Armarck, ‘[t]he concept of a social market economy comprises a wider 
complex of measures of social policy and a narrower complex of measures of economic 
policy’,71 which extends beyond mere modification of market principles. ‘A light-handed 
planning process’ that inserts social improvements is needed,72 one which does not 
disturb the competitive mechanism of market economy.73 This calls for a certain degree 
of ordering, ‘for the creation and protection of competition economy’.74 However, as 
Hayek remarked, ultimately, the definition of ‘social market economy and social justice’ 
is in the hands of politicians — hence his characterisation of ‘social’ as a ‘weasel word’ 
(ie ‘a word used in order to evade or retreat from a direct or forthright statement or 
position’).75 This flaw was recognised by Müller-Armack in 1965, who claimed that at 
that point in time it still had ‘not become very clear in the initial phase of the creation of 
the social market economy’ what role the ‘social’ aspect was to play.76 In practice, 
however, European politicians have placed far more emphasis on the social component 
than ordoliberals originally expected .77 
  
                                                        
69 Müller-Armack (n 5) 327-328. 
70 Barry (n 19) 109. 
71 Müller-Armack (n 5) 328. 
72 Alfred Müller-Armack, ‘Las Ordenaciones Económicas desde el punto de vistal social’ in Lucas Beltrán 
(ed), La Economía de Mercado, vol I (Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones 1948) 120. 
73 ibid 123. 
74 ibid (author’s translation, emphasis added). 
75 Friedrich August Hayek, ‘The Weasel Word Social’ (1983) 1 Salisbury Review; Merriam Webster online 
dictionary <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/weasel%20word> accessed 8 December 2015. 
76 Alfred Müller-Armack, ‘The Principles of the Social Market Economy” (1965) 3 German Economic Review. 
77 For a critical appraisal of this position of an evolutionary understand of the social aspect, see Wiseman 
(1989) 165-166. 
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3.4. Views on Economic Freedom 
Private economic freedom is constituted and enforced by a set of legal rules that to an 
extent ‘define mutually compatible private domains within which individuals are free to 
act, protected from encroachment by other private law subjects as well as from 
government intervention’.78 One of ordoliberalism’s pillars is protection from both state 
intervention and private abuse;79  threats to economic freedom arise from state 
intervention and the actions of private actors, such as monopolists or cartel members, 
who render private individuals dependent on modern private power structures, thereby 
correlating this concept with competition.80 In and of itself, protecting economic 
freedom has inherent economic value, but other non-economic content social 
considerations are also relevant, which, nevertheless, ought to be protected.81 
Additionally, the right to free contracting is also necessary in order for a market 
economy to function well.82 However, unrestrained contracting freedom may be abused:  
in the creation of cartels or the imposition of contract terms by a dominant undertaking, 
for example. Economic freedom, ‘can also be used to reduce the possibilities of others to 
act in a way which is conducive to competition, and they may even agree to this on a 
contractual basis’,83 this could imply that the transaction is not freely entered into if it is 
forced by a dominant undertaking, for instance. If left unrestrained, economic market 
power would result in humans becoming commoditised,84 as such, ‘laws and jurisdiction 
have to ensure that, in quite general terms, contracts are concluded which are as 
adequate as possible and that such contracts can be enforced’.85 Consequently, freedom 
of contract cannot contravene the economic order, nor should it lead to the 
                                                        
78 Vanberg (n 61) 8. 
79 Akman (n 8) 55; Gormsen (n 2) 331. On the views of the role of the entrepreneur, see Böhm (n 62) 58-
62; also seeing ordoliberal freedom as freedom of entrepreneurship, see Werner Bonefeld, ‘German 
Neoliberalism and the Idea of a Social Market Economy: Free Economy and the Strong State’ (2012) 
Journal of Social Sciences 139. 
80 Walter Eucken, ‘What Kind of Economic and Social System’ in Alan Peacock and Hans Willgerodt (eds), 
Germany's Social Market Economy: Origins and Evolution, vol 2 (MacMillan 1989) 35. 
81 Vanberg (n 61) 14. 
82 Hans Otto Lenel, ‘Evolution of the Social Market Economy’ in Alan Peacock and Hans Willgerodt (eds), 
German Neo-Liberals and the Social Market Economy, vol 1 (MacMillan 1989) 29. 
83 Streit (n 5) 688. 
84 Friedrich A Lutz, ‘Objeciones al Orden de la Competencia’ in Lucas Beltrán (ed), La Economía de Mercado, 
vol I (Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones 1953) 275. 
85 Lenel (n 84) 30.  
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establishment of concentrations of market power,86 a sentiment that touches upon 
prohibition cartels and the abuse of market power in EU competition law.  
4. Competition from an Ordoliberal Perspective 
4.1. Introduction 
Ordoliberal economic freedom cannot be understood without the existence of a 
regulated competitive economic process. Ordoliberals view competition as an 
instrument by which economic freedom is expressed, and protected from abuse. This 
section deals with the conception of competition from an ordoliberal perspective, 
equates freedom with competition as a process, and also features a discussion of the 
analytical concepts that inform economic freedom.  
Ordoliberal competition is a European competition policy, which is distinct from the 
Harvard, Chicago and Post-Chicago schools.87 Its main goal is protection of the freedom 
to compete [Wettbewerbsfreiheit], rather than achieving perfect or imperfect 
competition.88 Ordoliberals propose that general competition policy becomes part of 
society’s economic order, based on competition law, rather than advocating a micro-
economic modelling for a case-by-case assessment.89 This competitive order provides 
the legal framework within which the pursuit of individual freedom is restricted solely 
by  others’ freedom.90 
In stark contrast to the protocol pertaining to industrial organisations and competition 
economics, ordoliberal scholars did not use the language of mathematics to express their 
views. Indeed mathematical formulations have been qualified as ‘an unfashionable idiom 
(…) and they may be put forward with missionary zeal which is anathema to “positive” 
                                                        
86 Vanberg (n 31) 176. 
87 Akman (n 8) 59. For a short discussion on why ordoliberal competition policy differs from the Chicago 
School conception of competition, see Möschel (n 39) 147. This also appears to be the view of Van Miert, 
who remarks ‘how much easier it was to convince people of the value of a strong competition policy if one 
talked the language of the Erhard-style social market economy rather than the language of the Chicago 
School’: Van Miert (n 1). 
88 For more on the idea of ‘freedom to compete’ see, inter alia Erich Hoppmann, ‘Workable Competition – 
The Development of an Idea on the Norm for the Policy of Competition’ (1968) 13 Antitrust Bulletin 61; 
Vanberg (n 61) 09, 10; Heide-Jørgensen (n 90) 98-99.  
89 For Lenel, a ‘third wave’ ordoliberal, competition simply deals with ‘a micro-economic task: it is to 
regulate the individual economic relationships in such a way that production is in line with consumers’ 
wishes at the least possible cost’: Lenel (n 84) 265. 
90 Eucken (n 65) 250.  
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economics’.91 Arguably, this has led some to disregard ordoliberalism as mere politics or 
philosophy, indeed going so far as to dub it a ‘political economy unrelated to economic 
analysis’.92 However, these views neglect the historical context and overlook the true 
nature of the interdisciplinary language employed by the ordoliberals to express their 
views. As stressed by Gerber:  
the foremost vehicle for ordoliberal influence in shaping thought in these 
areas has been the new language it generated. This language features both 
a new grammar and a significantly altered vocabulary. The grammar — ie, 
the rules that structure the language — is based on the interplay of 
economic and legal ordering concepts. Economic analysis supplies the rules 
necessary for the market to function effectively and thus provides the 
standards for most economic policy decisions.93  
The fact that ordoliberals use non-technical language to express economic ideas does 
not imply that these concepts are not anchored in economic analysis, far from it. 
Although, the notable absence of mathematical language very likely accounts for the 
historical appeal of ordoliberal ideas to lawyers, and in particular, judges, as they tend to 
employ a legal language whereby abstract concepts are given interpretation and 
meaning through teleological interpretation. 
4.2. Competition as the Focal Point 
As far as ordoliberalism is concerned, competition is a necessary consequence of 
scarcity of goods and it has an indispensable function in terms of coordination and social 
organisation.94 The competitive order is deemed the  essence of the economy because it 
enables the system to function effectively.95 While there is no doubt that the competitive 
market system is the appropriate tool to be employed in this regard, it is up to the 
economic constitution to determine the legal terms under which competition is carried 
                                                        
91 Peacock and Willgerodt (n 3) 3. Cf this with the view of Möschel, who claims that ordoliberals did use 
economic models, such as the traditional model of perfect competition, in Möschel (n 39) 142. However, I 
have not found explicit economic modelling in any of the works reviewed. 
92 James S Venit, ‘Article 82: The Last Frontier – Fighting Fire With Fire?’ (2004) 28 Fordham International 
Law Journal 1157. In this work, Venit does not directly refer to any of the works of ordoliberal thinkers, 
with the exception of a single reference (by Moschel), which describes the focal points of ordoliberalism 
(fn 1). 
93 Gerber, ‘Constitutionalizing the Economy’ (n 2) 67 (emphasis added). 
94 Müller-Armack (1978) 325-326. 
95 Gerber, ‘Constitutionalizing the Economy’ (n 2) 43. 
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out in order for competition to be effective and efficient.96 The role of competition policy 
is to control private and public market power in order to guarantee competition as 
process 97  The idea of ‘perfect competition’ is a chimera because unregulated 
competition will tend to self-destruct owing to the accumulation of market power;98 to 
counteract this self-destructive tendency, ordoliberalism advocates state-imposed 
economic regulation by means of competition laws.  
For Eucken, market power concentration, monopolies, cartels and centralised planning 
all kill competition.99 Indeed, by the same rationale, free competition can only exist if it is 
organised by the state in accordance with liberal principles. The duty of the state then is 
to regulate competition and prevent the abuse of economic power.100 This was also the 
stance of the former European Commissioner Karel Van Miert, whom, in 1998 stated:  
economic reforms are all very well. Privatisation, deregulation, releasing 
initiative are clearly important. Only market forces will in the end get the 
collapsed state economies out of the rut. But market forces not only have 
to be released, they also have to be contained by accepted and enforced 
rules of the game. The invisible hand is not sufficient. Like a football match 
it needs rules of the game and a referee. The market is not anarchy but a 
subtle construct of human ingenuity.101 
However, competition policy has no value if excluded from the broader conception of 
the Ordnungspolitik. Ordoliberal competition policy is part ‘of a framework of a general 
economic system’102 and constitutes a key element of social market economy as a 
component in the ordering of economic freedom.103 It does so by focusing on the control 
                                                        
96 Vanberg (n 61) 7. 
97 Streit (n 5) 685. Cf with the view of Ludvig von Mises who pointed out that, as such, economic freedom 
does not exist and that ‘the market is free for as long as it does precisely what the government wants it to 
do’, Ludwig Von Mises, Human Action: a Treatise on Economics (4th edn, The Foundation for Economic 
Education Inc 1996) 723-724. 
98 Peacock and Willgerodt (n 3) 7. Cf with the view of Akman who argues that ordoliberalism promotes the 
ideal of perfect competition in Akman who argues that for ordoliberalism economic efficiency is just ‘an 
indirect and derived goal; its results generally from the realisation of individual freedom of action in a 
market system’ in Akman (n 8) 58-60. 
99 Eucken (n 101) 151. 
100 Somewhat similar is the view of Foucault who claims that, for ordoliberals, the state must govern for 
the market and not because of the market, Foucault and others (n 13) 121. 
101 Van Miert (n 1). 
102 Möschel (n 39) 154. 
103 Townley (n 105) 214. 
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and correction of price manipulation; maintaining the voluntariness of contracting,104 
and precluding market power abuse — by a sole entity or a group of entities 
coordinating their behaviour — by an administrative ‘monopoly office’ acting as a 
market police.105 Regulated competition is considered a means by which economic order 
can be maintained, by preserving the status of the market process as a foundation for 
social cohesion.106 Freedom to compete should not be restricted by legal rules grounded 
on inefficient economic grounds, but it cannot be left unregulated either as this would 
then degenerate into a state of unfair competition and social conflict.107 To this end, 
deciding whether:  
competition is restricted, whether competition is efficient or obstructive, 
whether or not price-cutting contradicts the principle of the system — all 
these issues can only be decided by investigations conducted by economics 
in the various states of the market.108  
 
4.3. Types of Ordoliberal Competition 
Ordoliberalism distinguishes between two types of competition: performance 
competition and prevention competition. Performance competition 109 
[Leistungswettbewerb] 110  denotes the ability to obtain competitive advantage by 
producing the best goods possible at the lowest price.111 Prevention competition 
describes competition as that which prevents a rival from performing at their best 
capacity.112 The aim of prevention competition, [Behinderungswettbewerb], a concept 
first coined by Nipperdey,113 is to damage the competitors’ position, without any 
                                                        
104 Kerber and Vanberg (n 32) 64. 
105 Rodger (n 21) 293; Rose and Ngwe (n 2) 8; Bonefeld (n 4) 8. 
106 Ebner (n 23) 213.  
107 Rodger (n 21) 294; Zweynert (n 18) 115. 
108 Böhm, Eucken and Grossmann-Doerth (n 62) 24-25 (emphasis in the original). 
109 Gerber interprets this concept in a slightly different manner and uses the term ‘performance 
competition’ to denote a similar idea, see Gerber, ‘Constitutionalizing the Economy’ (n 2) 53; Gerber, Law 
and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe (n 2) 253. 
110 As noted by Gerber, the concept of Leistungswettbewerb was first coined by Nipperdey — not an 
ordoliberal himself — in 1930 to delineate the idea of performance competition, which later evolved in 
ordoliberal thinking to represent consumer preference as the coordinator of the production process, see 
Gerber, ‘Constitutionalizing the Economy’ (n 2) 53. 
111 Felice and Vatiero (n 2). 
112 Gerber, ‘Constitutionalizing the Economy’ (n 2) 53. 
113 Nipperdey (n 115). 
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implication that the undertaking has improved its competition capacity, and as such is 
comparable to exclusionary abuses. One of the goals of ordoliberalism is to suppress 
prevention competition by forcing players to behave in accordance with pre-defined 
market rules. 
5. A Contemporary View on Ordoliberal Competition Policy 
5.1. Introduction 
I now turn to my suggestions for the understanding and readjustment of a contemporary 
ordoliberal competition policy based on traditional ordoliberal concepts. This 
interpretation is made from an analytical, rather than an historical, perspective.114 Due 
to the scope of this paper, I discuss the proposals in broad strokes, as these issues can be 
explored further in future ordoliberal-oriented research. 
5.2. The Institutional Design of Ordoliberal Competition 
5.2.1. An ordoliberal competition law 
Ordoliberalism proposes the establishment of an institutional and legal framework for 
the protection of the competitive process based on three main elements.115 Firstly, the 
adoption of an economic constitution, which sets the rules of economic behaviour, on a 
‘constitutional level’. At this macro level, a competition law defining behaviours contrary 
to the principle of economic freedom in clear terms must be enacted.116 This is in line 
with Böhm’s idea of the primacy of the rule of law over political and economic matters 
and the suppression of administrative discretion. Secondly, an independent body to act 
as the watchdog over market players and safeguard the economic constitution and the 
competitive process, that is to say, the market police [Marktpolizei] or competition 
authority.117  It is paramount that this competition authority is free from political 
pressure and private power influence. Thirdly, application of the law to concrete cases 
                                                        
114 For a historical, and alternative, perspective regarding the conception of an ordoliberal competition law, 
see Gerber, ‘Constitutionalizing the Economy’ (n 2) 49-56, and Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth 
Century Europe (n 2) 255. For discussion on contemporary ordoliberal ideas, see Behrens (n 7). 
115 Gerber, ‘Constitutionalizing the Economy’ (n 2) 54. 
116 The use of the term ‘law’ here is employed as meaning the product of legislative work of the Parliament 
and not as body of rules enacted by the executive power. 
117  Highlighting the importance and novelty of the autonomy of the Marktpolizei, see Gerber, 
‘Constitutionalizing the Economy’ (n 2) 55. 
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should be impartial; in accordance with the appropriate interpretation of the law, and 
subject to judicial review.118   
As part of the ‘economic constitution’, ordoliberals advocated the creation of a 
competition law objective, which was achieved in Germany with the 1957 enactment of 
the Act Against Restraints of Competition, which was in part modelled in line with 
ordoliberal thinking.119 The Act continues to be the competition law in force in Germany 
and, despite being amended on several occasions, still retains its ordoliberal influence. 
The main goal of an ordoliberal competition law is the protection of economic freedom, 
facilitated by ensuring that the competitive process and market structure are not 
distorted.120 This entails setting positive and negative limits on the freedom to compete 
in accordance with the rule of law and the economic constitution. As suggested earlier, 
such a law should foster performance competition and preclude undertakings from 
entering into prevention competition, focusing on exclusionary abuses.  
Such an instrument was proposed by Böhm during the enactment of the Act Against 
Restraints of Competition121 and rests on three main provisions:  
i) A general prohibition of anticompetitive agreements among undertakings 
[Verbotsprinzip];  
ii) Prohibition of the abuse of market power by a single undertaking 
[Missbrauchprinzip]; and  
iii) A concentration control regime [Konzentrationsprinzip].  
The Verbotsprinzip, outlawing anticompetitive agreements among undertakings, was 
formulated as a general and total prohibition, with no exceptions, and as such it 
                                                        
118 ibid 54. 
119 For a detailed historical account of the development of Germany’s competition law and the ordoliberal 
influence, see Neumann (n 123) 37; Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe (n 2) 266-
333. 
120 Similarly, see Protocol 27 of the Treaty of the European Union. See also Case C-6/72 Europemballage 
Corporation and Continental Can Company v Commission [1975] ECR 00495, para 26; Case C-85/76 
Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission [1979] ECR 00461, para 125; more recently, see the opinions of AG 
Kokott in Case C-95/04 P British Airways v Commission [2007] ECR I-02331, para 68; and Case C-8/08 T-
Mobile Netherlands and Others [2009] ECR I-04529, para 58; and the opinions of AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer 
in joined cases C-468/06 to C-478/06 Sot Lélos kai Sia v GlaxoSmithKline [2008] ECR I-07139, para 49.; 
See also Albert Sánchez Graells, Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules (Hart 2011) 195-201; 
Lianos (2013) 23-28. 
121 Möschel (n 39) 150. Also stressing Böhm’s influence when drafting the law, see Vanberg (n 31) 172-
173. Highlighting the political influence of Böhm as a member of the Bundestag, see Foucault and others (n 
13) 103. 
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exemplifies the more narrow ordoliberal approach adopted by ‘first wave’ of ordoliberal 
scholars. However, developments in ordoliberal thinking since then have (as they should) 
departed from such a stringent view. In this regard, I advocate allowing certain 
exceptions on the grounds of economic efficiency. A per se prohibition of all agreements 
makes little sense from an economic perspective: for example, vertical agreements solve 
the problem of double marginalisation and are largely pro-competitive. From a legal 
perspective, prohibiting all agreements constitutes a non-proportional restriction of 
economic freedom.  
The next principle, the Missbrauchprinzip, prohibition of the ‘abuse of market power’ by 
a single undertaking, limits the exercise of market power whenever it could curb parties’ 
economic freedom, including other undertakings and final consumers. The 
Missbrauchprinzip should not be based on precluding an undertaking from legitimately 
gaining market power under performance competition, nor ‘guesstimating’ how 
competition would have been had it lacked market power, albeit this is debatable as 
competition authorities consider counterfactual evidence when making an assessment. 
It should only prohibit a conduct whenever market power is abused by infringing 
economic freedom and/or whenever market power is exercised in such a manner that it 
has a measured negative impact on the legitimate interest of consumers in accordance 
with the principle of Leistungswettbewerb. 
The third principle, the Konzentrationsprinzip122 of control of concentrations was 
foreseen by Böhm and Erhard but not incorporated in either the Act Against Restraints 
of Competition or the Treaty of Rome.123 A concentration operation would be prohibited 
whenever a sole undertaking may significantly impede performance competition or 
unduly restrict the freedom to compete by either creating or strengthening a dominant 
position.  
Finally, the law should include an efficiency defence that can be applied for all three 
‘principles’, enabling the competition authority to declare any of the three provisions 
inapplicable when it comes to precluding specific behaviour or operation on the grounds 
                                                        
122 Term coined by the author. 
123 Neumann (n 123) 38. On the ECSC Treaty (the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel 
Community) there was an article dealing with concentration operations (Art 66) and only a rudimentary 
provision dealing with abuse of a dominant market position. 
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of duly justified and proven economic reasons in the interest of consumer welfare.124 
This disposition could either be drafted in general terms, covering all three principles or 
specifically for each of them. The latter is a better legislative option as it could address 
the specificities of each of the principles. The difficulty, no doubt, lies in the precise 
content of such efficiency (or efficiencies) clause(s) as administrative discretion is 
admitted, as recognised by the ECJ in Remia v Commission. 125  
5.2.2. The competition authority 
Ordoliberal competition law should be enforced by the Marktpolizei, an independent 
administrative competition authority. Initially introduced in Europe via 
ordoliberalism,126 this authority differed from the institutions created as a corollary of 
US antitrust.127 The competition authority, as envisaged by Böhm and Josten, is intended 
to be an independent agency with the competence to investigative and sanction 
breaches of competition law.128  If the competition authority were under undue 
influences of the executive power then it will be prone to pressure from political and 
economic powers that could impede its function as guarantor of the competitive process. 
Furthermore, cases should be decided by expert teams that include both lawyers and 
economists. Lastly, all decisions of the competition body must be subject to appeal at the 
judiciary level, not before an administrative body. 
5.3. Protecting Competition and Economic Freedom  
Ordoliberal competition policy’s goals are the protection of individual economic 
freedom to compete in the economic sphere and preservation of the competitive 
order.129 Protecting the competitive process and parties’ economic freedom ensures that 
                                                        
124 For a thorough discussion on consumer welfare as the standard adopted by ordoliberalism, see section 
15.3. 
125 Case C-42/84 Remia v Commission [1985] ECR I-02545, para 34. 
126 Gerber, ‘Constitutionalizing the Economy’ (n 2) 54-55. 
127 The Federal Trade Commission, the federal agency that deals with antitrust violations and consumer 
protection, preceded ordoliberal ideas and was established in 1914 by the Federal Trade Commission Act. 
For an account of the American Antitrust influences on EU competition law, and particular the work of the 
Commission and the EU judiciary, see Brigitte Leucht and Mel Marquis, ‘American Influences on EEC 
Competition Law: Two Paths, How Much Dependence’ in Patel and Schweitzer (n 26). See also the opinion 
of Gerber, who rejects the leading role of US antitrust as an influence on Germany and EU competition law 
in Gerber, ‘Constitutionalizing the Economy’ (n 2); Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century 
Europe (n 2). 
128 Van Hook (n 18) 245. 
129 Supporting this view, see Foucault and others (n 13) 120-121; Möschel (n 39) 146; Vanberg (n 61) 52; 
Hoppmann (n 90) 62. Arguably, this is one of the main differences between EU competition law and 
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the interests of consumers are satisfied and their wellbeing is guaranteed.130 Quite in 
line with this approach was the interpretation made by the ECJ of the goal of Art 101 
TFEU in stating that it ‘aims to protect not only the interests of competitors or of 
consumers, but also the structure of the market and, in so doing, competition as such.’131 
Economic freedom and freedom to compete should be protected as they are ‘public 
goods’132 that derive from the preservation of individual freedom.133 To do so, the prime 
objective of this competition policy is the protection of the competitive process 
[Wettbewerbsfreiheit] by setting a competitive standard of performance competition 
that implies adherence to the ‘constitutional rules’ and satisfies customers’ needs in 
accordance with the lawful capacities of undertakings and the security of individual 
freedom.134 The theory is that if the competitive process is protected, economic 
efficiency and social peace can be achieved. Such freedom to compete, however, requires 
that economic players have equal legal standing, whereby voluntary contracting and 
exchange are the means by which economic activities are coordinated.135 
This concept of freedom to compete demands that private parties behave in accordance 
with a set of pre-existing rules enshrined in the economic constitution, which serve as a 
guarantor and grantor of such individual freedom.136 For Vanberg, ordoliberalism 
should pursue the protection of freedom to compete because consumer welfare should 
then follow. Vanberg held that economic freedom would be violated if competition 
                                                                                                                                                                             
ordoliberalism, in the sense that for the former the primary goal is securing economic integration — while 
others argue that nowadays economic efficiency is the main concern, see eg, supporting this view, Case C-
56/64 Consten and Grundig v Commission of the EEC [1966] ECR 00429. For non-ordoliberal views where 
it is argued that the goal of competition should be the protection of economic process, see Gregory J 
Werden, ‘Monopsony and The Sherman Act: Consumer Welfare in a New Light’ (2007) 74 Antitrust Law 
Journal 707; Eleanor M Fox, ‘Against Goals’ (2013) 81 Fordham Law Review 2157. 
130 Vanberg (n 31) 176. Cf this with the view of the European Court of Justice, in stating that Art 102 ‘is not 
only aimed at practices which may cause damage to consumers directly, but also at those which are 
detrimental to them through their impact on an effective competition structure’, recognising the need for 
protecting competition as a process itself, in Case C-6/72 Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can 
Company v Commission [1975] ECR I-00495. Cf this with the view of Gerber, who suggests that economic 
freedom is secured via complete competition in which no firm can coerce the behaviour of another, in 
Gerber, ‘Constitutionalizing the Economy’ (n 2) 43. 
131 Case C-501/06 P GlaxoSmithKline Services and Others v Commission and Others [2009] ECR I-09291 
para 63. Cf this with the broad approach by the ECJ in Case C-52/09 TeliaSonera Sverige [2011] ECR I-
00527, para 60. 
132 Vanberg (n 31) 177.  
133 E Maier-Rigaud ‘On the Normative Foundations of Competition Law — efficiency, political freedom and 
the freedom to compete’ in Zimmer D (ed), The Goals of Competition Law (Edward Elgar 2012) 132-168, 
136. 
134 Möschel (n 39) 142; Akman (n 8) 273. 
135 Vanberg (n 31) 175. 
136 Vanberg (n 61) 10. 
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authorities were to prohibit conduct otherwise permitted by the economic constitution 
or if they were to allow it based on economic efficiency considerations but without legal 
provision.137 Thus, economic efficiency arguments have to ‘fit’ the set of rules.  
Freedom to compete is limited and secured by rules that preclude or allow specific 
conducts, which are legally incorporated at a ‘constitutional level’ (ie having the rank of a 
law) and which affect how competition policy is formed. Such a hierarchy precludes 
private parties from bending or renegotiating their content by means of private 
contracting.138 At a ‘sub-constitutional’ level, the competition authority applies the rules: 
monitoring, evaluating and sanctioning behaviours of individual actors. The content of 
these competition rules at a sub-constitutional level is determined by the text of the law 
and interpretation of the rules.139 I advocate that in order to effectively secure freedom 
to compete this interpretation must be teleological. Consequently, competition as a goal 
is neither void, nor an empty formula but is rather construed through the agreements 
that polity reaches regarding its legislation, even though this could open the door for 
some political discretion.  
5.4. Competition itself as Economically Efficient 
Protecting competition is efficient and desirable because it prevents society from 
playing out competition’s prisoner dilemma. The competitive process minimises two 
risks: cheating and under-competitive choices. Some actors will be tempted to 
circumvent the market’s rules for their own benefit at the expense of the other players. 
Consequently, the rest will then choose the under-competitive option — a protectionist 
regime —140 that benefits no one, to prevent ‘cheating’. The prisoner’s dilemma is by and 
large resolved if the members of society adhere to a competitive order imposed by the 
state in accordance to the rule of law.141 Provided the rules are properly designed then 
lawful behaviour by economic players will result in an economically efficient outcome. 
Herein lies the rational justification for an ordoliberal competition policy: it allows 
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138 Vanberg (n 31) 176. 
139 Vanberg (n 61) 10. 
140 Vanberg (n 31) 178. 
141 Cf with the view expressed by Foucault who stated that ‘(…) competition and only competition can 
ensure economic rationality. How does it ensure economic rationality? Well, it ensures it through the 
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undertakings to avoid the prisoner’s dilemma and punishes agents who deviate from the 
competitive outcome by cheating.142 
Another argument supporting the efficiency of competition as a goal in itself is that 
freedom to compete would be Pareto-efficient if ‘individual decisions have only a 
negligible influence on the market prices’.143 Accordingly, market power would be kept 
in check and there would not be any significant detrimental effect on market prices. 
Alternatively, in the absence of truly ‘free competition’ it would be possible to apply 
‘competition as if’ to guide the behaviour of players (I discuss this concept in detail in 
section 5.7).144 However, I find the logic of this argument to be unsatisfactory: in practice, 
freedom to compete and efficient outcomes will not necessarily coincide, for example, 
the freedom to compete will be dictated by the adoption of legal rulings that, by their 
very nature, might be sub-optimal from a welfare perspective. Another example would 
be that, in order to achieve a more efficient economic outcome, certain trading 
agreements and practices would be prohibited and, thus, economic freedom would be 
limited, particularly if the decision to prohibit certain practices is taken ex-post. This 
touches upon the fundamental issue of informing legal texts with appropriate economic 
foundations: the essence of modern ordoliberal policy.  
These arguments trump claims that protecting competition as a goal is economically 
unjustified,145 or that it protects ‘inefficient competitors which would conflict with the 
objective of enhancing welfare’, as Akman believed,146 or that ‘ordoliberalism is based on 
humanist values rather than efficiency or other purely economic concerns’, as Gormsen 
maintained.147The criticisms are founded on the (mis)understanding that securing 
economic freedom does not always coincide with fostering economic efficiency, from 
either a total or consumer perspective, and protecting inefficient firms. 148 
Ordoliberalism does not advocate the protection of inefficient competitors, nor does it 
advocate the adoption of an interventionist industrial policy. Akman makes the 
                                                        
142 Vanberg reaches a similar conclusion in his explanation of the tasks of the Ordnungspolitik in Vanberg 
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146 Akman (n 8) 268-269. 
147 Gormsen (n 2) 334. 
148 Akman (n 8) 276-277. 
Ignacio Herrera Anchustegui - Competition Law through an Ordoliberal Lens  163
important distinction that ordoliberalism does not promote efficiency as an aim but as a 
result. The distinction appears to me more dialectical than of any practical importance, 
as for as long as the competitive process is free, the practical result is economic 
freedom.149  
5.5. Control of Market Power 
Unrestrained market power, whether public or private, restricts personal economic 
freedom and corrupts and impairs the political system. On the one hand, private market 
power was a source of concern during the Weimar Republic (and even before this) when 
legal cartels were seen as an extrapolation of the freedom of contract, regardless of 
negative welfare consequences or reduction of competitive freedom to non-members of 
the cartel. On the other hand, state intervention in economic affairs was pernicious and 
ordoliberals opposed decisions such as the imposition of trade barriers, subsidies, price 
controls, and compulsory mediation for labour conflicts.150 These state actions were not 
excluded from private market power due to the considerable influence of economic 
groups.151 Such critical views against the accumulation of public or private market 
power do not prohibit dominant positions as such. Nor does ordoliberalism advocate 
stripping legally-earned market power through performance competition. What 
ordoliberalism does advocate is the imposition of legal limits on the exercise of 
individual or collective market power with a two-fold aim: preclude prevention 
competition that would restrict individual freedom, and avoid any undue intervention of 
private market power in public decision-making. The appropriate instruments for 
establishing limits regarding the exercise of market power are the economic constitution 
and competition law.  
5.6. Ordoliberalism and the ‘More Economic Approach’ 
Some supporters of a ‘more economic approach’ to EU competition law have rallied 
against ordoliberal ideas in an ‘attempt to replace the protection of the competitive 
process by a welfare maximisation goal in stark contrast to an Ordoliberal 
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150 Streit (n 5) 690. 
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conception.’152 The contention is that EU competition policy (arguably the Commission’s 
view on EU competition policy)153 has departed from an ordoliberal approach and a 
‘more economic approach’ has been adopted: once which is less form-based and more 
economically anchored. For example, Venit holds that the ordoliberal conception is out-
dated, formalistic, old-fashioned and even utopian.154 Recently, the ‘more economic 
approach’ has also been subject to strong criticism, particularly by Wils, who advocates a 
more ‘form based approach’ that can be traced to ordoliberal input.155 
Arguably, on occasion such objections have arisen due to misrepresentations of 
ordoliberal ideas, or by recourse to the works of Röpke and Müller-Armack 
(predominantly), authors who advocate more extreme versions of political 
interventionism; social and distributive concerns, and formalistic approaches to 
competition policy. However, these ideas are not representative of the majority view 
among ordoliberals.156 Furthermore, at times attacks against ordoliberalism result from 
the less ‘economically inclined’ teleological interpretation of the law by EU judiciary, 
which is then confused with ordoliberal ideas, rather than ordoliberalism itself.157  
Ordoliberalism does not reject the application of economic insights to resolve specific 
cases or improve the quality of legal standards and legislation. Arguments to this effect 
overlook the fact that ordoliberal competition is part of an institutional economics policy 
with the aim of achieving societal order based on rules that are imposed to govern the 
market and not a microeconomic trend of competition economics or industrial 
organisation,158 operating at different levels of application.  
An ordoliberal conception of competition policy is not incompatible with the ‘more 
economic approach’, nor has it disappeared from EU competition policy altogether. An 
ordoliberally-inspired EU competition policy is not necessarily at odds with a more 
                                                        
152 Patel and Schweitzer (n 26) 223. See also, for a discussion of the more economic approach, Giorgio 
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detailed microeconomic analysis of competition practices or a ‘more economic 
approach’; such an assessment would indeed be overly simplistic. Ordoliberalism does 
not preclude drawing on expertise to refine competition law decision-making and 
improve the legal regime. What it does reject is departure from the rule of law by 
adoption of a case-by-case assessment based purely on welfare considerations 
employed as a guiding policy instrument, in the absence of more formal or structured 
rules, which define the economic game.159 The claim is that a case-by-case assessment 
based purely on welfare considerations, without regard to general and previous rules, 
can improve competition and furnish legal uses with a fair degree of predictability.160 If 
a more economic approach is understood as an advocation of the application of modern 
economic insights (in accordance with the rules),161 then in fact ordoliberalism is 
congruent with examples of ‘more economically informed’ analyses of cases’. 
Consequently, an ordoliberal competition policy is in line with what Schweitzer and 
Patel qualified a ‘light’ approach, the proposal is that a review of the established 
application of competition law to better correlate with modern economic theory be 
conducted so that ‘EU competition (law) can be interpreted in a more concise and 
definitive manner.’162 
To resolve this apparent contradiction, regarding the merits of a more “economic 
approach” vs a case-by-case assessment, I propose reconciling ordoliberal competition-
institutional policy with neo-classical microeconomics, through an understanding of the 
level of application of these economic tools. An ordoliberal inspired policy shapes and 
sets the rules of an institutional framework, whereas a neo-classical microeconomic 
analysis of cases is the concrete application of the competition policy. 163  By 
distinguishing these levels of application, it is possible to introduce economic efficiency 
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analysis when deciding upon specific cases, through the interpretation of competition 
law applied to concrete cases, provided this possibility is foreseen by the legislator or 
the judiciary, as is the case in Art 101(3) TFEU. This does not mean, however, that a 
case-by-case economic approach influences competition policy, but rather the opposite: 
it is competition policy that allows for a case-by-case economic assessment, as noted by 
Vanberg: 
The advocates of economic freedom and Leistungswettbewerb have no 
reason to deny that comparing the prospective welfare effects of 
alternative rules of the market game is an essential prerequisite in 
choosing an economic constitution, and that economics can provide an 
important service by informing about the working properties of potential 
alternative systems of rules. What they reject is the claim that a ‘more 
economic approach’ can help to improve competition policy by informing 
about the specific welfare effects in particular instances.164 
Therefore, ordoliberalism is compatible with a contemporary competition policy that 
advocates the use of microeconomic theory to guide the proper application of the law in 
order to guarantee, as much as is possible, an economically coherent interpretation of 
the law. The key to such harmonisation lies in distinguishing the different levels at 
which competition policy and competition cases operate.  
5.7. ‘Competition as if’? 
Concerning the limitation of the abuse of market power, an ordoliberal concept 
occasionally linked to the ECJ’s interpretations of Article 102 TFEU,165 and the doctrine 
of special responsibility, the theory of ‘competition as if’, developed by Leonhard 
Miksch,166 a disciple of Walter Eucken, comes into play.167 Robert O’Donoghue and A 
                                                        
164 ibid 19 (emphasis added). 
165 See the analysis of Nazzini, who concludes that there is no historical indication that the concept of 
‘competition as if’ was proposed when drafting the now Art 102 TFEU during the Rome Treaty 
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Jorge Padilla go so far as to claim that ‘[o]rdoliberal thinking on the goal of competition 
law was based on notions of “fairness” and that firms with market power should behave 
“as if” there was effective competition’.168 ‘Competition as if’ employs legal competition 
framework which sets the ‘standard conduct’ that a dominant undertaking ought to 
follow whenever acting in the market. This concept resembles the special responsibility 
doctrine of dominant undertakings, whereupon stricter limits are imposed regarding 
dominant undertakings’ freedom to act, compared to non-dominant firms. In the words 
of the ECJ:  
an undertaking has a dominant position is not in itself a recrimination but 
simply means that, irrespective of the reasons for which it has such a 
dominant position, the undertaking concerned has a special responsibility 
not to allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition on the 
common market.169 
By ‘competing as if’, undertakings should behave as though they lack market power and 
consistent with performance competition.170 According to Gerber, this standard would 
not require governmental intervention as it is an objectively applicable measure which 
provides clear answers.171 From this perspective, the concept of ‘competition as if’ 
appears to be formalistic and almost per se.  
However, one of the main problems of ‘competition as if’ is that it is an impractical 
concept because competition is a ‘discovery process’ (put in Hayekian terms).172 The 
argument is that the competition authority would not invariably be able to determine 
how competition ‘would have been’ had parties been deprived of their market power. 
Furthermore, there are two different possible interpretations of ‘competition as if’: 
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171 ibid 52-53. 
172 Friedrich von Hayek, Die Theorie komplexer Phänomene (JCB Mohr 1972). For a brief discussion of 
competition as a discovery process, see Behrens (n 7) 20. 
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either ‘competition as if’ undertakings had no substantive market power, or ‘competition 
as if’ there were perfect competition. 173  Viewed from a different perspective, 
‘competition as if’ becomes imprecise and gives rise to legal uncertainty. Hayek’s 
criticism of ‘competition as a discovery process’, however, is a valid argument when it 
comes to any competition standard that does not employ a pure per se approach because 
any balancing act based on counterfactual evidence implies that the competition 
authority needs to foresee how ideal competition would have been. 
Furthermore, the idea of ‘competition as if’ has also been criticised because it arguably 
contradicts economic freedom and is therefore discordant with core ordoliberal ideas.174 
The fundamental aspect of this argument is that ‘competition as if’ implies that a 
dominant undertaking ought not to behave ‘as if’ it had market power and that it bears 
‘special responsibility’ to observe a far higher degree of care than undertakings which 
lack substantive market power. The argument is that, consequently, this standard would 
impose limitations on economic freedom. I agree in part with this criticism but argue 
that imposing limits on the behaviour of a dominant undertaking does not in fact 
contradict the precepts of ordoliberal economic freedom. What it does do is impose 
negative limits in order to secure the protection of competition and prevent abuses of 
market power vis-à-vis consumers. Nevertheless, I agree with the position that a 
dominant undertaking should not be deprived of its right to exercise performance 
competition [Leistungswettbewerb], in accordance to the limits imposed by an 
ordoliberal competition law. 
To conclude, I propose that contemporary ordoliberal competition policy should 
distance itself from the idea of ‘competition as if’ owing to to its deficiencies, instead 
clear competitive rules should be set that define which types of behaviour 
Missbrauchprinzip should encompass.  
5.8. Formalistic Approach or Case-by-Case Assessment based on Efficiency 
Concerns 
Ordoliberalism favours imposing negative limits on undertakings’ economic freedom by 
determining certain behaviours that are precluded in principle. In this regard, I propose 
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adopting a ‘form-effect’ policy grounded on a two-tier test, as a compromise between the 
pure per se and rule of reason approaches,175 which also differs (albeit slightly) from the 
‘object/effect’ doctrine elaborated by the ECJ.  
According to such an approach, rules would prohibit certain conducts based on their 
form, as prescribed by the law. All cases that do not expressly fit the precepts 
established by the norm and appear to have anti-competitive effects should be analysed 
in terms of performance competition to determine whether they infringe the 
competitive process and economic efficiency from a consumer-welfare perspective. The 
competition authority would only be able to prohibit a conduct when it proves that 
either the conduct qualifies as one of the prohibited behaviours or that it contravenes 
the principle of performance competition.  
Secondly, closely following the rule of reason approach, in all cases undertakings are 
entitled to invoke the inapplicability of the legal rule which prohibits the alleged conduct, 
requesting the application of an efficiency defence clause. If the behaviour is consumer-
welfare enhancing and proportional as regards the restriction of economic freedom of 
market participants then it should be declared compatible with the legislation. With this 
second tier, the form-effect approach rejects a per se approach by banning certain types 
of conduct, regardless of their economic consequences. However, ordoliberal authors 
such as Böhm advocated the introduction of per se behaviours in cases of predatory 
pricing, boycotts and loyalty-enhancing rebates.176 The suggested policy, nevertheless, 
also rejects a competition policy based on pure ‘rule of reason’ due to the legal 
uncertainty it creates, which can be understood as simply deciding on cases based on 
pure efficiency concerns, according to administrative discretion. 177 
The main benefits of the two-tier structure are its efficiency and flexibility. Most of the 
conducts that ‘fit’ the defined prohibited behaviours will not be pro-competitive and 
therefore undertakings will have scant interest to claim efficiencies that do not exist. 
Those cases will, by and large, be decided swiftly and with a small margin of 
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administrative discretion. Nevertheless, in those few cases in which the conduct may be 
efficient will not be declared outright as incompatible with the competitive market. The 
problem facing the form-effect approach is of a practical nature. Competition 
investigations would demand economic and legal expertise, which would be time-
consuming and therefore costly for both undertakings and society.  
5.9. Which Welfare Standard? 
The EU Commission, and a segment of the literature,178 advocate adoption of a 
consumer-welfare standard, based on the understanding that the competitive outcome 
should be beneficial to consumers.179 The academic and practical debate regarding 
whether consumer policy is also the standard adopted by EU law is well known and 
beyond the scope of this paper. In this section, I discuss the welfare standard that is 
employed by ordoliberalism.180 
The first wave of ordoliberals did not discuss welfare standards in modern economic 
language.181 Research shows that an ‘aggregated consumer welfare’ standard has been 
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179 Cf with the expression of Bork, who argues that economic efficiency should be the goal of competition 
law, in Robert H Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A policy at war with itself (1978). Blair and Sokol argue that, 
although he used the wording ‘consumer welfare’, in actuality he meant ‘total welfare’, in Blair and Sokol 
(2012) 476. Also arguing that Bork’s expression is confusing and meant aggregated welfare, see Peter C 
Carstensen, ‘Emerging Issues in Buyer Power Analysis’ (2012) 3 Agriculture and Food Committee e-Bulletin, 
American Bar Association 2, 4. 
180 See also, discussing consumer welfare standard and ordoliberalism, Ahlborn and Grave (n 169). 
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ordoliberals of the first or second wave. Cf this with the views of Vanberg, who argues that the debate 
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embedded in the discourse, particularly in the works of Böhm and Eucken in terms of 
the concept of Leistungswettbewerb (performance competition). Indeed, according to 
Böhm, the criterion determining where the line is drawn between permissible and 
forbidden behaviour is consumer interest. This view is far from universal however, for 
instance, Akman holds that ‘ordoliberal ideas are inconsistent with the “consumer 
welfare” approach.’182 In a similar fashion, Gormsen argues that protection of economic 
freedom and consumer welfare are incompatible and that consumer welfare is not a 
motivation for economic freedom whatsoever. 183  Other views suggest that 
ordoliberalism supports total welfare standard ‘as the result of a truly competitive 
process’, as Behrens puts it,184 or that it supports soft total welfare standard and was an 
influential precedent for the position of the Chicago School in such matters.185 However, 
in ordoliberalism, consumer interest is the director of the decisions of economic actors 
and the justifiable economic interest of any economic activity.  
These different positions reveal that ordoliberal ‘aggregated consumer welfare’ is a 
compromise between pure consumer welfare standard and full total welfare standard, 
in accordance with the principle that the consumer’s interest should be measured in a 
medium to long term.186 This compromise is the result of a balance between consumer 
protection and protection of competition as a process, which is not entirely successful. 
The essence of the compromise is the understanding that, for ordoliberalism, the 
consumer should not be understood as solely an end consumer in the downstream 
market but also in relation to other consumers in the competitive process and according 
to the interest in preserving competition as a desirable process.187  
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In terms of consumer interest, for Böhm a hallmark of the private law society is that ‘not 
only is the satisfaction of consumer needs well above the average for the members of the 
wealthy class but also they are offered totally different possibilities of productive 
activity within society’.188 He claims that consumer concerns are ‘the sole directly 
justifiable economic interest’. 189  In terms of performance competition 
[Leistungswettbewerb], the yardstick for measuring competitive outcome is therefore 
consumer interest. Leistungswettbewerb describes competition among undertakings that 
aims for the production of better services and products for consumers.190 For Vanberg, 
establishing the Leistungswettbewerb standard implies adopting rules that would put 
consumer’s preferences as the ‘ultimate controlling force in the process of 
production.’191 In this regard, as Röpke puts it, market order seeks to ensure ‘that the 
only road to business success is through the narrow gate of better performance in 
service of the consumer and not through many back doors of unfair and subversive 
competition’.192  
On the other hand, the ordoliberal construct argues for an aggregated view because the 
aim is protection of the competitive process, this in turn implies concern for the well-
being of the competitive structures and balancing gains and losses across all parties.193 A 
focus which is exclusively rooted in short-term consumer welfare may well lead to a 
‘disproportionate focus on the selling side of the market and an under appreciation’ of 
other competitive risks, such as buyer power, which is at odds with the protection of the 
freedom to compete.194  
In my view, the implication of this rationale is that pure consumer welfare standard is 
not consistent with ordoliberalism. In addition to the wellbeing of end consumers, it is 
necessary to take the interest of all consumers in the production chain into account, as 
well as the medium and long-term consequences affecting the competitive structure 
                                                        
188 Böhm (1989) 59 (emphasis in the original). 
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of the ordoliberal ideas of ‘consumer choice’, see Behrens (2014). 
190 Vanberg (1998) 177. 
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192 Wilhelm Röpke, A Humane Economy (3rd edn, ISI Books 1998) 31. 
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both upstream and downstream. A similar posture to this compromised approach was 
recently suggested by Kirkwood, who argues that: 
 the purpose of antitrust law — of competition law — is to combat conduct 
that both diminishes competition and reduces consumer welfare. For this 
reason, the fundamental goal of antitrust law is best described as 
protecting ‘consumers from anticompetitive conduct — conduct that 
creates market power, transfers wealth from consumers to producers, and 
fails to provide consumers with compensating benefits’.195 
This compromise implies that behaviours impacting the competitive structure upstream 
and downstream that are not necessarily directly detrimental to end consumers in the 
short-run could still endanger the competitive process. Should this be the case then the 
ordoliberal welfare approach argues that such conduct does indeed warrant competition 
intervention, even in the absence of short-term detriment to consumer conditions.196  
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, I have analysed and revisited the main concepts and ideas espoused by 
ordoliberalism as a social and economic policy, which applies competition law as one of 
the main instruments in the pursuit of the protection of individual freedom and of 
freedom to compete. Additionally, I embarked upon the rather ambitious task of 
proposing reinterpretation of ordoliberal ideas to align them with the development of 
EU competition policy as an economic analytical framework that guides the 
interpretation and application of competition law.  
As this paper shows, ordoliberalism is neither out-dated, nor is it an extinct trend of 
economic thought. Rather, it remains a valid means by which to guide the application of 
competition law. Furthermore, by acknowledging the limitations of ordoliberalism and 
reinterpreting its main postulates in a contemporary setting, it remains compatible with 
a contemporary economic approach to competition law (understood in terms of 
approving the application of microeconomics and industrial organisation models, which 
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guide decision-making regarding cases and, more importantly, suggesting changes to 
current legal standards and legal interpretations by the courts). Ordoliberalism adopts 
an interdisciplinary approach by virtue of its nature, and also because such a position 
results from interpretation that takes into account the goals of the legislation and the 
economic circumstances of each case.  
In addition, ordoliberalism is a well-suited analytical tool for EU competition policy due 
to two main factors. Firstly, it provides an indigenous European perspective when it 
comes to designing a coherent competition policy that is in line with goals of European 
integration; a system based on the social market economy, protection of the competitive 
process and the European economic constitution. Secondly, ordoliberal ideas, have 
historically and conceptually, been highly influential in terms of EU competition rules 
and their interpretation by the EU judiciary. These factors justify the need to re-open the 
debate regarding whether or not ordoliberal ideas are shaping and/or should continue 
to shape, the future of the EU’s competition policy.  
 
